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Board
Peter L. Strauss*
In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals,
Congress created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(“PCAOB”) under the aegis of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), with President Bush‟s support. Its purpose was
to replace deficient accounting industry self-regulation with effective
external regulation. The choices it made in doing so engendered
passionate arguments about constitutionally necessary presidential
authority and separation of powers. These divided the D.C. Circuit 211 and will be rehearsed before the Supreme Court in the coming
weeks. President Bush‟s administration defended those choices; Judge
Rogers, writing for the majority, found no valid constitutional
objection to them (albeit not without some difficulty). On the other
side, petitioners the Free Enterprise Fund and Judge Kavanaugh in
dissent marshaled strong arguments that, if accepted in their entirety,
*
Betts Professor, Columbia Law School. Thanks for able research assistance to Andrew
Amend, 08.
1.
Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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would put the constitutionality of a wide range of government
institutions in shadow. Starting with the constitutional text, and
seeming almost to regard the cases as a nuisance to an intermediate
court judge, Judge Kavanaugh‟s opinion is an open invitation to the
originalists on the Court.2 The grant of certiorari, after extensive
filings venturing far more deeply into the merits of the case than, in
the writer‟s experience, is generally supposed to happen, suggests that
the newly reconstituted Court could well prove sympathetic.
Perhaps because both majority and dissent invoked my
analysis of the constitutional issues respecting independent regulatory
commissions published a quarter-century ago,3 the editors of the
Vanderbilt Law Review invited me to write this preliminary essay,
setting before you the issues in the case. On or about November 2, you
will find in this space four essays from law professors long associated
with the constitutional issues in the case and chosen for the likelihood
they will prove to be in intelligent disagreement: Harold Bruff
(Colorado), Steven Calabresi (Northwestern), Gary Lawson (Boston),
and Rick Pildes (NYU). In early December, all five of us will post
responsive essays. Once the Court has published its opinion(s) on the
case, some or all of us may also offer a brief appraisal. Our
instructions are to limit our essays to no more than five thousand
words—quite a challenge even for table-setting, when one considers
that the D.C. Circuit opinions run almost fifty pages in the Federal
Reporter, and the certiorari filings alone are almost four times as long.
While all the parties agree that the PCAOB is to be considered
a “government entity,” it is in many respects—and not only those that
excited this litigation—an odd duck. Its five members each earn a
salary considerably higher than is paid to any person we might
usually think a government official, including our President.4 Its
employees are free of the salary restrictions and other characteristics
of the civil service system. The expense of maintaining them, like the
PCAOB‟s program generally, is not met by annual appropriations
under the Constitution‟s arrangements for reserving to the legislature
the “power of the purse.” Rather, those expenses are paid by fees

2.
Judge Kavanaugh appears to enjoy extending invitations to explore quiescent legal
questions of large constitutional dimension. See SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of Cong., 571
F.3d 1220, 1226-27 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (constitutionality of the
Copyright Royalty Board).
3.
Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
4.
The PCAOB Chair‟s annual salary is $673,000 and other members‟, $547,000, “roughly
four times greater than those of their alleged „superiors‟ at the SEC.” Brief for Petitioners at 4950, Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, No. 08-861 (U.S. July 27, 2009).
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collected from both the accounting industry the PCAOB regulates and
the public companies the industry audits, all in accordance with a
budget approved not by Congress but by the SEC. If concededly a
“government entity,” the PCAOB is not a “government agency” whose
activities are subject to, and made judicially reviewable by, the federal
Administrative Procedure Act.
In some of these respects—one might add, respects that are not
prominent in the litigation—the PCAOB is not alone. The Postal
Service, the Federal Reserve and its member institutions, the
Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Bonneville Power Authority are
among the mixed-character “government entities” Congress has
created over the years.
In certain respects, too, the PCAOB resembles quasi-public
institutions that since 1938 have regulated investment activities in
the shadow of the SEC, like stock exchanges and the National
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”). In that year, the Maloney
Act5 permitted any securities association that registered with the SEC
to discipline its members for violating the organization‟s rules, but
such discipline was subject to the plenary supervision of the SEC.6
This delegation of authority to these organizations was done in the
interest of promoting self-regulation. Subsequent changes both
expanded the self-regulatory organizations‟ authority, to permit their
enforcement of SEC as well as their own regulations, and enhanced
the SEC‟s oversight,7 “to ensure that there is no gap between selfregulatory performance and regulatory need.”8 While these
organizations control the bringing of disciplinary actions, any ultimate
discipline they impose is subject to plenary review by the Commission,
which is free to substitute its judgment as to both policy and facts.9
Their activities are diverse and important and their expertise
substantial, supplying disciplinary resources the federal government
could not easily afford.10 In many respects, the PCAOB-SEC
5.
Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938).
6.
R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir. 1952).
7.
E.g., Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975)
(expanding the SEC‟s authority over self-regulatory organizations).
8.
S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 2 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 181.
9.
For a general consideration of this scheme, see NASD v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803, 805-07
(D.C. Cir. 2005), on which this paragraph generally relies.
10. Consider the following language drawn from a graphic display from the 2008 Annual
Report of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, which in 2007 displaced both the New
York Stock Exchange and the NASD as the “self-regulatory organization” for their memberships:
FINRA Regulatory Actions in 2008. FINRA is empowered by the federal government
to protect American investors from fraud and bad practices. In 2008, FINRA took
vigorous enforcement action against firms and brokers who harmed investors: [(1)]
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relationship was modeled on these established institutional
relationships. One might think differences were created in the
interests of both closer SEC control and avoidance of self-interested
self-regulation. It is these differences that fuel the constitutional
issues in the PCAOB case.
The New York Stock Exchange, the NASD, and now the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) operate under
SEC review, but they control their officers and budget. Those
institutions adopt their own rules of discipline and practice, albeit
subject to standards the SEC will enforce on its review of individual
disciplinary proceedings. The PCAOB is much more tightly under SEC
control. Its budgets and the fees that support them must be approved
by the Commission. The rules it enforces are subject to Commission
approval and displacement. Its leadership is appointed by the
Commission to fixed terms of office, and that leadership can be
terminated prematurely by the Commission only on a finding of
“cause” on one of three specified grounds, two of which require
“willful” misconduct in office.
Yet the SEC itself, as an independent regulatory commission,
has only a limited relationship with the President, who by our
Constitution is vested with the executive power and is responsible to
see that all federal laws “be faithfully executed.” Its Commissioners,
too, serve fixed terms and may be removed by him only “for cause.”
The President‟s capacity to supervise its policymaking is, at best,
untested. If Congress in creating the PCAOB made it—unlike the New
York Stock Exchange, the NASD, and the FINRA (or for that matter,
the American Bar Association, lawyers‟ self-regulatory organization)—
so close to the SEC as to have become “a government entity,” did it fail
to recognize the President‟s constitutionally required place in
American government?
The Constitution‟s text expects that there will be government
departments, but says nothing about them or their authority beyond
requiring their heads to be appointed by the President with senatorial
confirmation, and to have an obligation to give the President, on his
demand, a “written opinion” about the manner in which they will
exercise their (necessarily statutory) duties. One must stand in awe of
Collected more than $28 million in fines from individual brokers and firms[; (2)]
Ordered or secured agreements to return more than $1 billion to investors[; (3)]
Expelled or suspended 19 firms, barred 363 individuals from the industry and
suspended 321 others[; and (4)] Reviewed nearly 100,000 individual communications
from firms to investors, resulting in 476 investigations.
FINRA, REFORMING REGULATION TO BETTER PROTECT INVESTORS 4 (2009),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/@about/@ar/documents/corporate/p119061.pdf.
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the variety of designs Congress has created over our history in
fulfilling its need to create the “necessary and proper” institutions of
American government—and, as well, of the infrequency and
clumsiness with which the Supreme Court has addressed the
propriety of its choices. The first Congress created officials in the
Treasury Department whose statutory responsibilities were more to
Congress than to the President. Congress soon had chartered the
United States Bank—close to being, if it was not precisely, a
“government entity”—with enormous sway over the national economy.
By 1852, as the recent scholarship of Jerry Mashaw has called to our
attention,11 it had created a collective of Supervising Inspectors of
steamships, also loosely connected with the Treasury Department,
that effectively introduced the first essentially independent regulatory
body to the government menagerie. There followed the Federal
Reserve Bank with its dependencies, the alphabet soup of
“independent regulatory commissions,” powerful government
corporations like the TVA or the Postal Service, single-headed
agencies with fixed terms of office not coincident with presidential
administrations (notably, the Social Security Administration), the
independent special prosecutor, and so on.
Although these congressional structures answer often to
congressional appreciation of the need for institutional distance from
raw politics (but perhaps also to an impermissible congressional
preference to substitute its own supervision of “faithful execution” for
the President‟s), few of them have come to the Supreme Court, and
fewer have been disapproved. Clearly established are some principles
safeguarding against congressional aggrandizement of its own role.
Congress cannot confer on itself a function in appointment to12 or
removal from13 executive office beyond senatorial confirmation and
impeachment, or create mechanisms for disapproving executive action
other than by enacting statutes or withholding appropriations.14
What Congress is authorized to do in regulating the President‟s
relationships with the agencies it creates is much less clear. In 1926,
after holding the case over for reargument, a bare majority of the
Supreme Court wrote Myers v. United States15 using language that
many have taken to support strong versions of the President‟s
11. Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from
Jackson to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1638-41 (2008).
12. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126-28 (1976).
13. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725-27 (1986).
14. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952-59 (1983) (holding the one-House legislative veto
unconstitutional).
15. 272 U.S. 52, 107, 122 (1926).
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necessary role, but in a context in which the Senate had tried to
require its own approval of the removal of an executive official from
office. Not a decade later, in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,16
the Court wrote unanimously (and promptly after argument) that
Congress could make a Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
Commissioner‟s five-year term of office safe from earlier presidential
termination unless “for cause,” albeit while pretending that this was
because the FTC performed no significant executive function.17 Half a
century later, in Morrison v. Olson,18 seven of eight Justices, with only
Justice Scalia dissenting, approved Congress‟s post-Watergate
creation of the office of independent counsel. Appointed by a special
judicial panel, and under only limited supervision by the Attorney
General, the independent counsel was responsible for investigating
and possibly prosecuting high executive officials—even the
President—suspected of crime. No one could or did pretend that the
independent counsel performed no significant executive function; the
majority, rather, concluded that the possibility of the Attorney
General‟s removing him “for cause,” and his obligation ordinarily to be
governed by general Department of Justice policies created a
constitutionally sufficient relationship to the President—a totality-ofthe-circumstances conclusion with which Justice Scalia violently
disagreed. It is fair to say that Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison—
the latter especially—will be under significant pressure in the
Supreme Court‟s consideration of this case.
Congress‟s authority to structure executive appointments
(beyond the ban on its own participation other than Senate
confirmation) is remarkably murky in the cases. “Principal” officers
require presidential nomination and confirmation by the Senate. The
Constitution permits Congress to assign the appointment of “inferior”
officers “in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the heads
of Departments.” This, of course, hardly describes the civil service
system, which might initially have been thought a regime just for
clerks and similarly powerless employees,19 but which Congress also
applied to powerful bureau chiefs.20 Appointment of the independent
counsel by a special judicial tribunal survived in Morrison when the
16. 295 U.S. 602, 627-29 (1935).
17. If they had to be characterized in “branch” terms, all of the FTC‟s functions save
perhaps reporting to Congress would today be recognized as “executive” in nature.
18. 487 U.S. 654, 663-67, 685-93 (1988).
19. See United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 483-85 (1886) (treating a naval cadet
engineer as an inferior officer).
20. HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL BUREAU CHIEFS 9
(1983).
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majority found him an “inferior officer,” again on an analysis Justice
Scalia found insupportable.
Three years later, Freytag v. Commissioner21 put before the
Court the appointment of a relatively minor quasi-judicial official of
the Tax Court (a body established by Congress under Article I and not
an Article III court). This official was held to be an “inferior officer” in
constitutional terms, not merely a constitutionally unspoken to
“employee,” because he exercised decisional authority. Justice
Blackmun, for a bare majority, invoked an essentially originalist
theme: given the Framers‟ apprehensions about “the most insidious
and powerful weapon of eighteenth century despotism,” the
appointment power, the “heads of Departments” Congress could
authorize to make appointments must be the heads of Cabinet-level
departments. These departments, he reasoned, are “limited in number
and easily identified. Their heads are subject to political oversight and
share the President‟s accountability to the people.”
Having announced this rationale—which the official in
question escaped because the majority somehow associated his
appointment with the “Courts of Law”—the Court appended a footnote
as curious and muddling as the Humphrey’s Executor Court‟s denial
that the FTC exercised executive branch functions: “We do not address
here any question involving an appointment of an inferior officer by
the head of one of the principal agencies, such as the Federal Trade
Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . and the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.”22 If one believes this footnote,
what has become of the majority‟s historically grounded insistence
that the authority granted by the constitutional text be limited to
Cabinet-level departments, small in number, and to “heads of
Departments” who share the President‟s accountability to the people?
Justice Scalia (who has been heard by your author to describe Freytag
as the single worst opinion of his incumbency) concurred for four. He
rejected the majority‟s “Courts of Law” rationale and simply took the
constitutionality of the FTC in particular (and the great variety of
federal agencies in general) to have become established. History
trumped originalism in this case; given all the congressional water
that had been permitted to flow under the bridge, a return to the text
would simply be too disruptive.23 If, dear reader, you are shaking your
21. 501 U.S. 868, 881-86 (1991).
22. Id. at 887 n.4.
23. One is reminded of a remarkable line from Justice White‟s dissent in another virtually
impenetrable separation-of-powers case, N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50, 94 (1982): “Whether fortunate or unfortunate, at this point in the history of
constitutional law [the question what limits may exist on Congress‟s ability to create
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head by this point, it may not surprise you to learn that Justice
Scalia‟s opinion, for four only, is taken by all the PCAOB parties to
represent what Freytag stands for.
“Inferior officer” issues became somewhat clearer with Edmond
v. United States,24 which permitted the Secretary of Transportation to
appoint civilian members of the Coast Guard‟s Court of Criminal
Appeals. Justice Scalia wrote for all but Justice Souter that “in the
context of a clause designed to preserve political accountability
relative to important government assignments, we think it evident
that „inferior officers‟ are officers whose work is directed and
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by presidential
nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” The tension in
this formulation, expanded on in the paragraphs below, was
vigorously exploited by both of the lower court opinions in PCAOB,
and is in an uneasy relationship to Morrison. One can read Judge
Kavanaugh‟s dissent, in particular, as an invitation to the Court to
overrule that case.
And now, the PCAOB. The challenge to it faces preliminary
obstacles that might appeal to a Court disinterested in further
roiling—or clarifying—these murky waters. Perhaps the Court will
conclude that petitioners have not exhausted their administrative
remedies (because they brought this action as a facial challenge,
perhaps attempting to force a resolution of the difficult constitutional
issues in the abstract), that there has as yet been no “final” agency
action that would be requisite for judicial review, or that the
importance of unresolved and important questions of statutory
meaning make the constitutional questions not yet ripe for judicial
resolution.25
adjudicative institutions to carry out federal policy that are not Article III courts] can no longer
be answered by looking only to the constitutional text.”
Justice Scalia has expressed no great love for Humphrey’s Executor, even if he has accepted
that this particular horse has long since left the proverbial barn. His dissent in Morrison, for
instance, refers to Humphrey’s Executor as “gutting, in six quick pages devoid of textual or
historical precedent for the novel principle it set forth, [the] carefully researched and reasoned
70-page opinion” of Chief Justice Taft in Myers, 487 U.S. at 725-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Just
this Term, in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1817 (2009), writing for himself
and three others, he employed a grim simile identifying as “the lion‟s kill” the “power that
Congress has wrested from the unitary Executive” via the creation of independent regulatory
agencies, and recurred to Freytag in denying any “reason to magnify the separation-of-powers
dilemma posed by the Headless Fourth Branch.”
24. 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997).
25. An earlier effort to raise similar separation-of-powers questions failed on these grounds
at the court of appeals level by a vote of 3-0, but with each of the three deciding judges,
strikingly, choosing a different one and rejecting both of the other two of these possible threshold
rationales. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731, 732, 745, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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But let us assume, as the essays to come almost certainly will,
that the constitutional issues on which Judge Kavanaugh‟s dissent
forcefully centered will prove decisive. Are the PCAOB‟s Members
“principal officers” of the United States, whose appointment must,
therefore, be made on presidential nomination and senatorial consent?
Even if they are “inferior officers” of the United States, do the
circumstances of the PCAOB violate the Constitution‟s arrangement
for the appointment and removal of such officers because they are put
entirely in the hands of the SEC, an independent regulatory
commission, and thus beyond the effective reach of political (i.e.,
presidential) oversight?
Here one easily sees the disconnect between the two halves of
the sentence just quoted from Justice Scalia‟s opinion in Edmond.
Freytag‟s originalist theme is preserved by “in the context of a clause
designed to preserve political accountability relative to important
government assignments”; but that theme does not so clearly live in
“directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed
by presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”
The PCAOB easily meets the latter criterion. But, given the
independence of the SEC, does it meet the thrust of the former? To
relate this question to constitutional text: by creating one
“independent” authority within another, has Congress discovered a
way impermissibly to delegate important executive “duties” to officials
who are beyond the President‟s effective ability to command an
“Opinion, in writing” on the manner in which those duties will be
exercised? That is, if we assume that the President is able to command
such an opinion from the SEC (which in turn, like the Secretary of the
Interior, can deal with its inferior officers), can he do so with the
PCAOB?
Those who take the strongest view of presidential authority
read in the Constitution‟s text a commitment to a President who must
be able to discipline any executive officer and whose powers include
the right to command their performance of discretionary duty along
the lines that he prefers. They may hope (as Judge Kavanaugh hinted
he did) that the Court will reach as far back as Humphrey’s Executor
and undo the mischief done to that view by permitting Congress to
establish agencies whose heads can be removed only “for cause.” Or
perhaps, resolving the tension in Edmond, the Court will conclude
that the “heads of Departments” permitted to appoint and remove
“inferior officers” must at the least be answerable to the President for
their actions—alter egos he can himself remove at will. One could
think such a conclusion is required to preserve “political
accountability relative to important government assignments.” The
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fact that Board Members‟ work is “directed and supervised at some
level by others who were appointed by presidential nomination with
the advice and consent of the Senate” would on this reading prove to
be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of constitutionality.
This condition might be satisfied if the authority to appoint and
remove PCAOB heads were vested in a person, such as the SEC Chair
(and the chairs of most independent regulatory commissions), whose
tenure in that position—if not as a Commissioner per se—is subject to
presidential termination at will. One might well think that Congress,
in (typically) making the position of Chair subject to presidential
termination at will, has been accommodating the demands of effective
presidential oversight. Strikingly, this is the general position for the
SEC—the Chair, and not the Commission, is formally responsible26 for
the internal appointment and control of important officials such as
bureau heads. But for the PCAOB, it is the Commission as a whole,
not the Chair, that holds appointment and removal authority. Since
the Commissioners are not removable at will, the effect is to double
the level of “for cause” protection.
Then there is possibly the question whether “for cause” has a
constitutionally necessary minimum dimension—a question the Court
has never yet had to answer, and that would perhaps serve us better
resting in continued obscurity. Congress has usually not been so
specific about what “cause” is to be. It was fairly specific in Morrison,
but then (as may be evident) that opinion, already shadowed by
Edmond, could well fall by the wayside in this case. The Court‟s
current makeup is quite different than it was in 1988. And there are
narrower possibilities. With respect to the PCAOB, Congress was
unusually specific about what could constitute “cause” for a Board
member‟s removal: to be established after notice and a hearing before
the Commissioners, she must be shown “willfully” to have violated
relevant law, “willfully” to have abused her authority, or “without
reasonable justification or excuse, [to have] failed to enforce
compliance with any such provision or rule, or any professional

26. A reorganization plan drawn up by President Truman, that in effect created the Chair‟s
“chief executive” status, gave the Commissioners of the SEC authority over his appointments
analogous to the Senate‟s power respecting the President‟s. That is, his appointment of “the
heads of major administrative units under the Commission shall be subject to the approval of the
Commission.” Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950 § 1(b)(2), 64 Stat. 1265, 1266 (reproduced in
the U.S. Code as an appendage to 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006)). The Chair is thus compelled to consult
with the other four Commissioners—and, indeed, the small numbers and their continuing
relationship must make those consultations in practice, quite meaningful; yet, wishing to keep
his vulnerable leadership position, he must also consult with the President, who needs no one
else‟s agreement to appoint a different Commissioner as chair.
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standard.”27 Though, as the majority below observed, “willfully” is a
term to be interpreted in the shadow of constitutional requirements,
and a concrete occasion for testing the meaning of these provisions has
not yet arisen, one could believe they give the SEC less room to
remove Board members than the President has to remove
Commissioners.
Should the President demand an “Opinion, in writing” from the
Commissioners of the SEC on a discretionary rulemaking28 pending
before them, it is not difficult to imagine that he would be permitted to
treat their refusal to comply as insubordination, constituting cause.
But can he make such a demand of the PCAOB, or require the SEC to?
And would the PCAOB‟s refusal to comply with such a request
constitute “cause”? While Sarbanes-Oxley gives the SEC plenary afterthe-fact review authority over the merits of PCAOB actions of every
kind, controls over its budget, etc., it does not appear as such to
specify this kind of consultative role even for the Commission. If in
practice, as appears to be the case, the SEC has on occasion demanded
prior consultation in the course of approving PCAOB actions, would a
Board refusal meet the statutory definitions of “cause” for removal?
And even then, any such removal would come at the hand of the
Commission, not the President. As petitioners emphasize, any
oversight authority the President may have is only in relation to the
SEC, and not to the PCAOB. The “second layer” of independence the
PCAOB enjoys is a narrow way of understanding its arguable
constitutional flaws, and it is at the heart of Judge Kavanaugh‟s
strongest dissenting arguments. But, again, no one has yet tried to
remove anyone, for any reason.
Beyond the considerations of abstraction and prematurity
already suggested, respondents can be expected to rely on the several
ways in which Congress has granted the SEC power to control the
PCAOB. They will certainly emphasize that how the SEC has been
using its authority in relation to the PCAOB in practice is largely
missing from the record, and that it seems rather more complete than
the authority the SEC has been entrusted with over stock exchanges
and the NASD for almost seven decades. For strong presidentialists,
again, the problem here is that this is SEC authority, not presidential
authority, and hence is disconnected from Article II‟s placement of the
responsibility for seeing to the laws‟ faithful execution in the
27. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 101(e)(6), 107(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(e)(6), 7217(d)(3)
(2006).
28. Put this way to eliminate the more difficult questions that would be presented by
presidential efforts to consult about on-the-record adjudications, recognized as early as Myers.
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President‟s hands. Is it a further constitutional problem that the SEC
may not have a statutory obligation to supervise the PCAOB‟s
preliminary actions—its decisions to investigate, to initiate
disciplinary actions, etc.? Petitioners so argue; the government asserts
and Judge Rogers concluded that the SEC could require its prior
approval of decisions on investigation and enforcement. Moreover, it is
perhaps here that the analogy to the self-regulatory organizations like
FINRA will have its greatest purchase. They, too, are subject to
complete SEC review of final actions, but not to decisions of this
preliminary character. And the notion that the President‟s executive
authority entails a capacity to control which individuals are
investigated and prosecuted conveys a particularly dramatic view of
his powers, one that may bring to mind the scandals of past “enemy
lists” and other abuses of power a Court might hesitate to keep from
Congress‟s protective control.
Asked by the editors merely to set the table for the essays to
follow, I venture no views on the merits of these issues, beyond
asserting their difficulty and observing that the Republic has survived
for a long time without their resolution. Somehow the case brings to
mind a remark I heard attributed to Prof. Alexander Bickel, a
passionate proponent of “the passive virtues,” and the man at whose
feet I first encountered Administrative Law. Congratulated by a friend
for his victory in the Pentagon Papers case, which he had briefed and
argued, “Yes,” he replied, “victory is sweet. But there are some
questions better left undecided.”

